CHROOT(2)                 FreeBSD System Calls Manual                CHROOT(2)

NAME
     chroot - change root directory

LIBRARY
     Standard C Library (libc, -lc)

SYNOPSIS
     #include <unistd.h>

     int
     chroot(const char *dirname);

DESCRIPTION
     The dirname argument is the address of the pathname of a directory,
     terminated by an ASCII NUL.  The chroot() system call causes dirname to
     become the root directory, that is, the starting point for path searches
     of pathnames beginning with `/'.

     In order for a directory to become the root directory a process must have
     execute (search) access for that directory.

     It should be noted that chroot() has no effect on the process's current
     directory.

     This call is restricted to the super-user.

     Depending on the setting of the `kern.chroot_allow_open_directories'
     sysctl variable, open filedescriptors which reference directories will
     make the chroot() fail as follows:

     If `kern.chroot_allow_open_directories' is set to zero, chroot() will
     always fail with EPERM if there are any directories open.

     If `kern.chroot_allow_open_directories' is set to one (the default),
     chroot() will fail with EPERM if there are any directories open and the
     process is already subject to the chroot() system call.

     Any other value for `kern.chroot_allow_open_directories' will bypass the
     check for open directories, mimicking the historic insecure behavior of
     chroot() still present on other systems.

RETURN VALUES
     Upon successful completion, the value 0 is returned; otherwise the
     value -1 is returned and the global variable errno is set to indicate the
     error.

ERRORS
     The chroot() system call will fail and the root directory will be
     unchanged if:

     [ENOTDIR]          A component of the path name is not a directory.

     [EPERM]            The effective user ID is not the super-user, or one or
                        more filedescriptors are open directories.

     [ENAMETOOLONG]     A component of a pathname exceeded 255 characters, or
                        an entire path name exceeded 1023 characters.

     [ENOENT]           The named directory does not exist.

     [EACCES]           Search permission is denied for any component of the
                        path name.

     [ELOOP]            Too many symbolic links were encountered in
                        translating the pathname.

     [EFAULT]           The dirname argument points outside the process's
                        allocated address space.

     [EIO]              An I/O error occurred while reading from or writing to
                        the file system.

     [EINTEGRITY]       Corrupted data was detected while reading from the
                        file system.

SEE ALSO
     chdir(2), jail(2)

HISTORY
     The chroot() system call appeared in Version 7 AT&T UNIX.  It was marked
     as "legacy" in Version 2 of the Single UNIX Specification ("SUSv2"), and
     was removed in subsequent standards.

BUGS
     If the process is able to change its working directory to the target
     directory, but another access control check fails (such as a check for
     open directories, or a MAC check), it is possible that this system call
     may return an error, with the working directory of the process left
     changed.

SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
     The system have many hardcoded paths to files where it may load after the
     process starts.  It is generally recommended to drop privileges
     immediately after a successful chroot call, and restrict write access to
     a limited subtree of the chroot root, for instance, setup the sandbox so
     that the sandboxed user will have no write access to any well-known
     system directories.

     For complete isolation from the rest of the system, use jail(2) instead.

FreeBSD 13.1-RELEASE-p6       September 29, 2020       FreeBSD 13.1-RELEASE-p6